

Introduction

Africa's Road to the War on Terror

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Since the events circa 11 September 2001 African commentators have reacted to the US-led war on terrorism as either “a back to the future moment” or a grand opportunity to ensure that the continent performs more than an adequate role in the pivotal issue in international security. With respect to the back to the future moment, Adekeye Adebajo asserts that Washington changed its anti-colonial stance during the Cold War and shifted to articulating the priorities associated with the global struggle against containment.¹ In the midst of the new strategic realities the United States reduced the rhetorical pronouncements concerning “self-determination” and thereafter moved to undermine fledgling democratic experiments throughout the continent.

In a further shift, successive US presidents supported authoritarian regimes that were willing to support their agenda, but when the Soviet Union collapsed the United States ended its association with its former proxies, leaving those governments to fend for themselves as many drifted to failed or collapsed state status. Though Adebajo accepts the realities of Africa's paramount role in the war on terror, he and others are concerned about what will happen when the war ebbs. At issue, will Washington become dismissive of its strategic partners when the war on terror concludes? Similarly, what will happen to continental priorities during the course of the war on terror? These are the issues that are of concern for Adebajo and others that support his observations.

Conversely, there are a host of scholars that assert the war on terror offers an opportunity for Africa to develop into and retain the unique global posture of “strategic relevance.”² If and when Africa finds itself as a priority, say these scholars, it is when a state within the continent is embroiled in a host of negative events such as famine or starvation (Somalia and Ethiopia), genocide (Rwanda), civil war (Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Democratic Republic of the Congo), or the HIV/AIDS pandemic (a host of states in the sub-Saharan region of the continent). In all cases these issues have the following commonalities: the world's attention span and its prescriptions have been woefully inadequate, the pledges unfulfilled, and Africa has always been perceived in a negative light.

The war on terror, as stated above, distinguishes Africa's strategic relevance and brings many of its states to “the fore.”³ In this realm the states within the Horn of Africa and those in the Sahel have emerged as critical “frontline states” in this new global conflagration. These states, along with others, have increased the attention

to the aforementioned issues and moreover have focused the continent and the international community to the threat of terrorism.

There are still those that explicate the war on terror offers the region the opportunity to preclude the “emergence of another Afghanistan” and it permits the African Union, working with the United Nations, or the United States, to rid the region of regimes that are listed as state sponsors of terror or those collapsed states (Somalia) believed to harbor senior al Qaeda operatives.⁴

Whatever the reason, negative or positive, Africa finds itself embroiled in yet another international conflict, and like the Cold War, the war on terror is not of its making. The task of this study is to provide a comprehensive introduction to illustrate Africa’s road to the war on terror. In the sections that follow the objective is to explore some of the internal and external indices (collectively these indicators illustrate why Africa is both a target of terrorism and a place where it has flourished) that demonstrate Africa’s growing participation in terrorism and to exemplify why it is a critical strategic partner in the war on terror. The final section concludes with “the structure of the study” providing the reader with a brief overview of the chapters in this study.

The Case for Terrorism in Africa

In understanding Africa’s path to terrorism and why the continent remains a source for recruitment for al Qaeda, a source of terrorist financing, and equally significant, why the continent is replete with terror havens for bin Laden’s “Afghan Arab” or his senior lieutenants, who roam the region in search of sympathetic clerics or indigenous groups to exploit, the next two sections provide an illustration of the internal and external indicators that symbolize why Africa is potentially the “next front in the war on terror.”⁵

Internal Indices

According to African scholar Ted Dagne, a host of internal indicators are available to illustrate why the continent is now and will be a major player in the war in terror. The indicators are viewed this way: the “abject poverty and official corruption makes many parts of Africa a very attractive destination for terrorist organizations. Terrorist groups also see political, ethnic, and religious tensions in Africa as a favorable environment for penetration.”⁶ This is a very powerful statement and it illustrates the opportunities that have developed in Africa during the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods for the recruitment of terrorists, attainment of operational bases, and sources of funding for al Qaeda or its affiliated terror groups in the region. The section below examines some of the indicators listed by Dagne.

Islam

Religion is by far one of the critical variables that have induced fears of increased terrorist penetration throughout Africa. Nearly a third of Africa’s 800 million people

are Muslim. For most observers there has been an overemphasis on the al Qaeda threat. In reality much of the Islamic revivalism has its roots in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia has built or refurbished numerous Mosques throughout Africa. Similarly, many Saudi conservative clerics, under pressure at home and exiled from their own country, have preached a host of anti-Western and anti-American Wahhabi laced messages throughout East Africa and beyond. Pakistan has endeavored to build mini-Madrasas in many of the Sahel countries, and many Pakistani and Saudi jihadists have inundated local bazaars with cassette tapes filled with messages calling for the “destruction of infidels” or jihad against US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Mauritania and Chad, for example, this issue had become so prevalent that both countries have sought US assistance to stem the tide of what both states have described as increasing Islamic revivalism.⁷

In response to claims by the US and other countries about the increase of terrorism in the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa, the International Crisis Group launched a major study on the spread of and the threat of Islamic Revivalism. The report underscores the threat to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. According to the report there is indeed reason for concern:

While some observers have been skeptical of North Africa as a front in the war on terrorism, the battle with the GSPC in Chad appears to support US claims in this regard. The question is whether the GSPC case is an isolated incident or part of a larger trend. Each of the PSI countries suffers from a variety of threats that could easily trigger a rise in Islamism among the general population. While Niger and Mali are democratizing, with Mali having an excellent record on freedom of the press and Niger advocating separation of religion and politics as well as freedom of religion, Chad and Mauritania are very different stories. The Chadian government is dominated by one ethnic group and [is] irredeemably corrupt with the Darfur crisis having brought in more than 200,000 refugees.... An interest has been shown in all 4 PSI countries with respect to Sudanese controlled or backed Islamist missionaries or NGOs, with Chad in particular being subject to infiltration by Sudanese Islamists traveling under forged identities. Mali is the most clearly targeted, with a broad range of groups, some politicized, others apolitical, and some armed moving into the northern part of the country in large numbers. Algeria has been the main source of the GSPC influx, but others are coming in from South Asia and the Middle East.⁸

This excerpt illustrates the threat long conveyed by Sahel countries and the United States, but one often ignored by experts as an exaggeration and even a manipulation of events and facts by regional states in the Sahel to secure American military and economic assistance. While one may quarrel with the long-term necessity of assistance, both military and economic, the reality of Islamic revivalism cannot be dismissed.

Elsewhere in North Africa, the ever-increasing specter of terrorism in Nigeria, a major oil producing state, both before and after 11 September 2001, has been a cause of great concern. Terrorist attacks against oil refineries and Christians throughout the country, along with a host of religious-based killings, have heightened awareness in the region and elsewhere on the continent. The influx of radical Islamists from the Middle East is indeed alarming. Similarly, evidence abounds that Nigeria has become a target of aggressive, radical Sunni Muslim “agents with support from

religious charities and other outreach (da'wa) groups headquartered in Saudi Arabia. In recent times, the main aim of Islamists in Nigeria has been the establishment of extreme Shari'ah, along the lines of the Wahhabi sect, as the exclusive law in the Muslim states of the north."⁹

Equally alarming is the presence of Taliban clerics in Nigeria preaching their brand of Islam and seeking to covert the indigenous population to their extremist sect. In an instructive example of the presence of radical Afghani clerics, consider the following:

A "Taliban" cleric, Alhaji Sharu, told police he had received funds for the Nigerian network from al-Muntada al-Islami, an agency headed by Dr. Adil ibn Muhammad al-Saleem and based in Britain, but associated with the official Saudi state charitable and Da'wa institutions, the Muslim World League (MWL), World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and al-Haramain Islamic Foundation. All these groups are alleged by American and international investigators to be terror-financing bodies. Including al-Muntada al-Islami, they are together represented in the US by the "Friends of Charity Association," with a website at www.foca.net, and by the Washington attorney Wendell Belew.¹⁰

There is little doubt that the presence of "outsiders" in Nigeria and elsewhere on the continent continue to foment religious tensions among Africa's often marginalized Muslims. The question unanswered by the Nigerian government is how they will respond to the threat of Islamic fundamentalism.

Political Terrorism in Africa

Political violence is and continues to be a source of terrorism in the region. The use of political terrorism in this context is a synonym for state sponsored terrorism. No region of the continent is immune from this practice. One could select a host of recent examples, whether in Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mauritania, that provide a sense of the pervasive nature of this practice.¹¹

In most cases the violence is associated with authoritarian regimes that desire to hold on to power and will kill indiscriminately to do so. Similarly, this form of terrorism is associated with ethnic, clan, tribal, and in some cases religious rivalries that have induced counter violence. Another form of political violence occurs in states where regimes have come to power and maintain relationships with their previous colonial masters, a practice that has spawned a host of anti-government movements that have caused rebel or insurgent violence. Incidences of insurgency, particularly those involving Islamic groups, are often penetrated or receive external support or direction by al Qaeda. Viewed collectively, al Qaeda utilizes political violence as a source of recruitment and propaganda, the result of which has increased instability and chaos in countries within the continent. It should be noted that this is a minority of cases; the vast majority of cases involve indigenous groups that have no connection to bin Laden. In the end the cycle of political terrorism has no end. Indeed many of these cases are historic whether in the case Rwanda, Algeria, or South Africa.¹² The war on terror continues apace; political terrorism at some point

needs to be confronted. Unfortunately many of these states have partnered with the US in its war with al Qaeda, and Washington (in need of allies) has and continues to turn a blind eye to “the terrorism from within” that, at least in Africa, will preclude any long term success in the war on terror and will incessantly serve as reminder that this form of violence can only undermine an otherwise necessary war.

Failed States and Terrorism in Africa

Failed states dominate the landscape in Africa. These states have historically been corrupt, unable to govern, and have in some cases lost territory to rebels. African failed states have the following familiar characteristics. The typical African failed state is a country that is dominated by “factionalization of its ethnic and religious groups, [and] uneven access to and rewards from its economy and the absence of human rights.”¹³ On the historical legacy of African failed states, Franklyne Ogbunwezeh offers his take:

The African continent is littered with failed states. Most of these states are economic backwaters, social apologies and political ruins. This landscape runs from the Casablanca to the Cape Town and from The Horn of Africa in the East to the Island of No Return in the West Atlantic. Most of these states true to type were the creatures of imperial convenience. To that end, they were meant to serve a purpose after which their ontological legitimacy or *raison d'etre* would then expire. At this expiration; the states, naturally not designed for self-propulsion; were condemned to tether on the brink, and finally implode upon the inglorious weight of their inherent contradictions. Colonialism designed and inspired the problems. But the decadence was then driven along by a horde of native pirates; trained in the fine art of piracy. These set of political actors were rogue personalities, weaned on selfishness. They were brilliant students of kleptocracy and political perversity. In about four decades they completely outclassed colonial perfidy and bested them in thievery. They did an inglorious job of mismanaging Africa, so much so that she is today the laughing stock of the world.¹⁴

Irrespective of this brilliant statement there are two controversies surrounding this debate. The first issue is a definitional one. Scholars have incessantly quarreled over the meaning of “failed states.” The most acceptable definition has been this: a failed state “is one in which the government does not have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force.”¹⁵

As one would expect, the overwhelming majority of these states reside in the global south and are non-Western states. In a refutation to their negative status, many of these states have asserted that their status is historically connected to the old colonial era and is now resurfacing under a new neo-colonial impulse.

Second, failed states have been linked by the administration of George W. Bush to terrorism. The reason associated with the US president’s view is a simple one: in the ungoverned territories of these states terrorists have carved out their own sanctuaries. In other cases, such as in Afghanistan or Sudan, terrorist entities (al Qaeda) have established special relationships with outlaw governments and thereafter established

shelters in which a series of terrorist operational facilities were constructed and then used to launch devastating attacks on US and Western interests.

Among the current regions where failed states reside, Africa figures prominently in that many of its failed states have assisted al Qaeda directly or many of its affiliates have worked on behalf of bin Laden's transnational enterprise. Of these states Somalia has long been considered a target by the West, most notably the United States in the wake of the closure of al Qaeda's major operational base in Afghanistan. With its major strategic base closed, the view among US intelligence experts (and terrorist analysts the world over) is that bin Laden's legions would establish a new base in Somalia. Long before al Qaeda was evicted from its traditional home, US and NATO intelligence assets monitored Somalia from the air, via the Predator unmanned intelligence drone (and other platforms), on land via US Special Forces, along with those from Britain, and from the sea with naval forces utilizing sensors that were trained to monitor the communications of terrorists. Collectively, the US and NATO were prepared for a showdown with Somalia. Events in mid-December of 2006 when the Union of Islamic Courts (a group believed to harbor or is led by senior Al Qaeda operatives), or "UIC", assumed control Mogadishu, ended the debate over the "coming showdown." Thereafter, Ethiopia, with presumed backing from the United States, intervened and routed the forces of the Islamic Courts, and now occupies the country. Time will tell whether Somalia's long civil war has dissipated or if this is just a pause before returning to the renewal of clan dysfunction.

There are other examples of problematic failed states in Africa. In Central and West Africa, for example, a host of states figure prominently in support of al Qaeda or have knowingly or unknowingly provided refuge to its operatives. In a unique example the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, and Liberia were indicted as participants in bin Laden's criminal enterprises to fund his transnational network. This relationship was a long and profitable relationship for all participants:

[Collectively they] have already provided opportunity for al Qaeda and criminal networks possibly affiliated with it to profit from the marketing of diamonds and other precious gems. Wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and Liberia opened this door and local warlords like Charles Taylor readily collaborated.¹⁶

In the wake of the strategic realities associated with failed states and the connection to terrorism, scholars have called for a dramatic influx of diplomatic activity along with increased economic investment. While the military option is often suggested it is a short term attempt at a quick fix in what is, in the case of African failed states, a long term problem.

External Indices

In this section the objective is to provide examples of the external variables that are critical indicators as to why Africa is ripe for terrorist penetration or how exogenous entities have already established themselves in various parts of Africa. This section examines the impact of the al Qaeda threat and additional threats in the form of other

terrorist entities in the Middle East and elsewhere that have used African states as sanctuaries to launch terrorist attacks in the region and around the world.

The al Qaeda Threat

With few exceptions the principal external terrorist threat is al Qaeda. Bin Laden incessantly opined about an Islamic Caliphate. In the view of many Islamic militants, Africa is a natural focus of Wahhabist activity. In a vivid example, during the period 1991–1996 Sudan served as al Qaeda’s central base of operations before intense pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt forced bin Laden to move his legions to Afghanistan.

Though Sudan represented a major safe haven for al Qaeda’s presence and operational activity, East Africa remains the central target for jihadist penetration. To illustrate al Qaeda’s strategy in the region, the words of Abul Bara’ Hassan Salman, the Deputy Emir of Jamaat e-Jihad Eritrea (Eritrea Islamic Jihad Movement), an al Qaeda affiliate, are instructive:

Politically, the African Horn refers to all the countries in East Africa. It includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The area is of particular importance as it links the East with the West through the Red Sea that is between the agrarian and industrial societies. The region is also an oil producer and a giver of mineral deposits in the Red Sea. The Horn’s strategic security significance increased since the establishment of a Jewish nation in Palestine. These catalysts, along with some others, made the region a highly sought-after place particularly by the colonialists and imperialists, both past and present.¹⁷

Having set the stage for Western strategy, Bara’ Hassan Salman asserted the region belongs to Islamists and not the West. In March of 1998 the Eritrean Islamist thereafter offered the following counter jihadist strategy:

The external front ... is a very sensitive front from the aspect of our strategic security. In this respect we (a) liaise and exchange our experience and expertise with other Muslim organizations which also work to challenge the various corrupt regimes in the region; (b) concentrate our activities amongst Muslims through means which will enable them to see the conspiracies of the enemies and their plots to uproot Islam and Muslims; (c) strive to generate suitable opportunities to support our jihad through Islamic means; (d) move around neighboring countries and expose the corruption of the Eritrean regime and its danger over the entire region on the religious, security and political fronts.¹⁸

In the years since Bara Hassan Salman’s statement a number of additional terrorist groups have worked to implement or carry out the aforementioned strategy. Those terrorist organizations include Al-Ittihad al-Islamia and later the Union of Islamic Courts, each of which exists in Somalia. The view by many experts is that the “suitable opportunities to our jihad through Islamic means” represents a clear reference to al Qaeda and its charitable worldwide support structure. Second, the use of middle level operatives within the transnational terror network to assist the local terrorist groups with their implementation of their agenda is another indicator of al Qaeda’s presence in the region. In the end there are other determinants.

Islamic militancy is a hallmark of the region and it certainly predates bin Laden's network. That said, East Africa maintains the potential fertile breeding ground for al Qaeda's religious rhetoric.¹⁹ One of the interesting barometers of al Qaeda's presence concerns the increase in radical anti-American messages and the burgeoning upswing in pro-bin Laden clerics. As a result of these twin activities, the transnational terror network "has had some success in recruiting East African Muslims to conduct guerrilla operations with transnational objectives. These operations have primarily been to attack US interests."²⁰

It is noteworthy that several al Qaeda-sponsored attacks were carried out in the region. Those attacks include a significant strategy in Mogadishu that resulted in the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia. Mohammed Atef, the former leader of al Qaeda's military operations, undertook to privately train elements of Mohammed Farah Aidid's militia, resulting in the downing of two Black Hawk helicopters and the killing of 18 elite US military personnel. In the wake of the attack bin Laden hailed the success and offered these additional post-attack comments:

It is my companions that fought with Farah Aidid's forces against the US troops in Somalia. But we were fighting US terrorism. Under the cover [of the] United Nations, the United States tried to establish its bases in Somalia so that it could get control over Sudan and Yemen. My associates killed the American's in collaboration with Farah Aidid. We are not ashamed of jihad. In one explosion 100 American's were killed [a gross exaggeration of US troop deaths; this was an effort to kill US peacekeepers stationed in a hotel in Yemen, that were schedule to rotate in Somalia as a part of Operation Restore Hope, but none of the forces perished in the explosion. They left hours before its detonation], then 18 more were killed in the fighting [in Somalia].... After that 28,000 US soldiers fled Somalia. The American's are cowards.²¹

A number of other attacks—using al Qaeda cells from regional elements—occurred in the region. Those attacks include the 1998 East African Embassy bombings that destroyed US interests in Kenya and Tanzania that "coincided with the anniversary of the first deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990."²² In November 2002 the transnational terror group launched a deadly attack against a hotel in Mombassa, Kenya and was followed by a subsequent shoulder fired assault on an Israeli commercial jet that fortunately missed. Once again cells involving regional entities took part in the attacks.

Outside the region other associates of al Qaeda have been busy sponsoring their own terrorist attacks. In the Sahel, for example, the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) has caused damage throughout the region, resulting in kidnapping of European tourists and the deaths of Mauritanian and Chadian soldiers among its numerous terrorist sprees.

Elsewhere in North Africa, Moroccan Islamists, also with long established relationships with al Qaeda, launched a series of attacks on 16 May 2003 in Spain that resulted in the deaths of 45 people. The method of attacks moved beyond the bombing of a restaurant but involved 12 suicide bombings. Similarly, additional attacks have been conducted against European interests, principally in Spain in March of 2004. This and a host of other planned attacks were inspired by bin Laden. As noted al Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna observes, "The threat of terrorism has

shifted from al Qaeda to associated organizations.” Gunaratna made this additional statement: “Al Qaeda has become a movement; it is no longer a single group.”²³

Evidence of this movement has resulted from bin Laden’s appeal that Muslims worldwide participate in a renewed jihad against occupying US forces in Iraq. According to Central Command (CENTCOM) well over three hundred North Africans have been killed or captured. The fear among US military planners is that Iraq has become a training ground for terrorist groups, and worse many of the terrorist tactics used in Iraq—particularly the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS)—may be employed against US forces in the Horn and in North Africa.²⁴

Lastly, in Somalia, the UIC as stated earlier, launched a takeover of Mogadishu and thereafter attempted to extend its control elsewhere in southern Somalia. The UIC movement, along with its alarming rhetoric, forced regional states, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, to take note. With perceived US encouragement, Ethiopia in response to the UIC threat invaded the capital and currently occupies it. For now, the military occupation has temporarily halted the Islamic revival in Somalia. To date troops from the Transitional government have assisted forces from Ethiopia in a joint effort to restore order to the capital.²⁵

Additional External Threats

Al Qaeda is not the only external group that has thrived in Africa. Historically the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Hamas and a plethora of Palestinian terrorist groups have been active in Africa or have sought sanctuary in Africa. In recent times Sudan has been the terrorist haven of choice. All of the aforementioned groups and others have received sanctuaries, many of which, including al Qaeda, have constructed terrorist training facilities and launched operations from Sudan.²⁶

Libya is another well known terrorist sanctuary housing not only Arab terrorist groups, but was also home to many European, communist and other terrorist organizations from around the world. The leader of Libya, Muammar Qaddafi, used these, along with Libyan terrorist groups, to help finance terrorist operations against Israel, Egypt, Chad, Sudan, and most notably, the United States. Additionally, Libya was home to many terrorist training camps.

One of the interesting realities is that the Libyan sponsored terrorist organizations that maintained bases in the country dominated the headlines in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Libyan threat came to an unofficial end following former president Ronald Reagan’s decision to launch a counterterrorist strike in the wake of the Berlin discothèque bombing that killed American military personnel.²⁷

As far as terrorist havens go, the decade of the 1990s belonged to Sudan. The difference between Sudan and Libya is that it was Qaddafi’s incessant terrorist operations against US interests that forced the closure of the bulk of Libya’s terrorist related facilities. In time many of the terrorist groups that operated in Libya sought shelter elsewhere or invariably reduced their profile. In the case of Sudan the Islamic regime of Omar el-Bashir, aided by the National Islamic Front (NIF), was responsible for political terrorism against its own people both during the pre- and post-11 September period. By contrast, al Qaeda established a relationship with the regime that included financing of infrastructure projects in exchange for terrorist

training camps. Within these facilities and elsewhere in Sudan, bin Laden and the el-Bashir government hosted a series of “terror conferences” that involved the “who’s who” in terror groups. In the most significant of these conferences, al Qaeda and some 250 leaders of terrorist organizations formally agreed to a jihad against the United States. Prior to this, and certainly thereafter, a host of terrorist attacks were launched against the US and allied interests.

The historical record indicates that the tremendous pressure unleashed by the Saudis, Egyptians and the US forced al Qaeda to leave its sanctuary in Sudan. However, it took an additional counterterrorist strike by the Clinton administration to bring the attention of the West to the potency of the threat posed by and within Sudan. It would take the events of 11 September, however, for Sudan to formally join the war on terror and decrease its sponsorship of terrorism. In the post-9/11 world many of the terror groups that operated in Sudan sought sanctuary elsewhere rather than risk the wrath of the Bush administration.

Structure of the Study

In an effort to provide a comprehensive analysis of the multiple dynamics that set foundation for Africa’s participation in the war on terror, this study begins with **Part I: Opening Perspective**. In the opening chapter, noted African scholar Greg Mills illuminates “Africa’s New Strategic Significance.” The author notes that Africa’s strategic significance is manifested in a number of ways: from the “lily pads”, American access to countries that are strategically located, the mere fact that many of its countries have been designated as “frontline states in the war on terror”, and finally, Mills provides an exhaustive examination of the efforts by the United States to build a host of integrated regional military and economic partnerships to ensure that participant states are prepared to confront local and international terrorists threats.

Part II: The Combined Joint Task Force and the War on Terror is designed to explore the role of two of the critical members of the combined joint force. In Chapter 2, Othieno and Davis examine the preeminent role enjoyed by Djibouti in the war on terror. As the “center of gravity” of the task force, this chapter explores the “extensive military activity” that continues at Camp Lemonier, a base that is home to over 1,200 US military personnel, with additional forces aboard ship, and with French forces stationed at the base camp as well. This chapter closes with an examination of the economic and political benefits to Djibouti in the wake of its partnership with the United States.

In Chapter 3, “Kenya and the Search for a New Role in a New War,” Raymond Muhula asserts that since the East African embassy bombings in August of 1998 Kenya and Tanzania have each established separate relations with the United States to preclude future acts of terrorism within their respective countries. In the case of Kenya the author asserts the relationship underwent a dramatic change following the events of 11 September, offering bases to US army and naval forces and the long established joint US–Kenya military relationship has dramatically increased. Since that tragic day Kenya has been elevated to the status as a “frontline state.” Moreover,

internally the government of Kenya has worked to introduce and implement a host of counterterrorist bills to ensure that they are prepared to address internal threats on their own. According to the author these counterterrorist measures have produced an anti-Muslim backlash because such legislation dramatically increased the number of detentions and deaths of Muslims throughout Kenya.

Part III: Regional Dynamics examines the external and internal indices that have increased, rather than decreased, the likelihood of terrorism within Africa. As an attendant consequence regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and select regions have come under increasing pressure to move proactively to deal with the burgeoning issues that produce or have accelerated regional and external terrorist threats. Chapter 4—“Globalization and its Impact on the War on Terror”—by Judy Duncker opens this section. The author endeavors to explicate how a number of “globalization currents”—from terrorist chat rooms, integration of regional military organizations that have developed in response to the al Qaeda threat, the evolution of a host of new entities (African Coastal and Border Security Program, Terrorist Interdiction Program, Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System, and a other measures)—have been developed by the US and its African coalition partners to confront the transnational terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda and its regional affiliates. Additionally, the author examines the regional (AU) and supranational (UN) efforts to interdict terrorist financing, what all experts assert is a critical measure to ending the threat posed by terrorism.

Mohamed A. El-Khawas begins this section with an examination of the first of two critical regions. In Chapter 5 “North Africa and the War on Terror,” El-Khawas explores why North Africa has long been considered a haven of terrorism. Among the countries within the region, several figure prominently in terrorism; they include Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, each of which are major hubs of transnational terror which has seen participant terror group involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and—equally troubling—many cells from various North African organizations have participated in bombings in Europe, most notably in Spain. Additionally, this study examines how these countries have cooperated with the Bush administration in the war on terror, and finally, the response of the aforementioned countries to the US-led war in Iraq.

Examining another region, Ambassador Robert Palmer, in Chapter 6, “Political Terrorism in West Africa”, makes a bold statement: while al Qaeda is indeed a threat to the region, the greater threat is internal. That threat is the ever-present specter of state sponsored terrorism in a region that continues to disrupt the development of mass political participation. Surveying critical countries—Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, to name a few—the author explores the historical legacy of colonialism and how it is manifested in a host of authoritarian leaders within the region who, in order to stay in power, unleashed a reign of political terror against their political foes. In an interesting twist, the author asserts that the combination of political terrorism is as much a threat to the outbreak of terror in a region teaming with Muslims as is al Qaeda’s presence. To exacerbate the situation “firebrand clerics” have used this threat to increase Islamic revivalism in the region.

In the final chapter in this section—Chapter 7 “The Role of the African Union: Integration, Leadership and Opportunity”—Sam Moki explicates that of all of the

institutions in the region, the African Union (AU) receives little attention in its efforts to work with member states and their efforts to confront terrorism. The nature of this chapter involves the examination of the role that the AU has performed in dealing with continental terror; this study explores the multiple rivalries of member states that affected the organization's ability to deal with terrorism. Lastly, this chapter considers another fascination: why the AU's efforts to pass or implement regional measures to deal with terrorism are often eclipsed by the Western countries and the actions by the UN.

The final section, **Part IV: Clinton and Bush: Impact on Africa**, examines two US presidential administrations and their disparate efforts to deal with terrorism in the region. In the initial study, Chapter 8 "The Clinton Approach: Sudan and the Failure to Capture bin Laden", the editor asserts that the signature events of the pre-11 September era occurred in Sudan, the alleged terror capital of Africa and Clinton's failure to capture Osama bin Laden before his departure to Afghanistan. Equally fascinating, this chapter argues that Clinton's war on terror preceded the simultaneous destruction of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This essay endeavors to illustrate that it was Clinton's "silent war" with Sudan that informs us as about the president's post-embassy approach to terror in the wake of the East African embassy bombings.

In Chapter 9, "The Bush Model: US Special Forces, and the War on Terror", the editor explores the Bush administration's radical decision: the president's approach used coalitions to minimize the US military footprint. To that end the administration decided that in order to preclude Africa from becoming the next front in the war on terror it was important to use intelligence and US Special Forces to redefine American relationships with a host of critical states in the region. Similarly, this chapter explores the bureaucratic politics that set in motion the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa, The Pan Sahel Initiative, and Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, coalitions that symbolized the Bush administration's strategy to include Africa in the US-led war on terror. This chapter closes with an assessment of these coalitions.

This study concludes with "Africa and the War on Terror: An Assessment." In this conclusion, the editor uses aspects of the aforementioned chapters to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Africa phase of the war on terror. In this chapter a host of additional issues will be examined. These issues include the growth of anti-Americanism in the wake of the US-led war on terrorism; the on-going problem of reciprocal intelligence sharing; the decline of African issue prioritization; political terrorism in Africa; and the impact of the US indifference to anti-terrorist training, among other issues.

Notes

1. Adekeye Adebajo, "Africa and America in an Age of Terror," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2–3, 2003, pp. 175–176.
2. The opening chapter, "Africa's Strategic Relevance" by Greg Mills will provide this perspective for the reader.
3. J. Stephenson Morrison, "Somalia's and Sudan's Race to the Fore in Africa," *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2002, p. 201.
4. Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, "Africa and the War on Terror," *Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal*, October 2003, p. 46.
5. There are those that believe that Africa is already the next the front in the war on terror. There are several measures to support this supposition: the presence of US forces, which while in the region to train regional partners, is nonetheless a "magnet" for recruitment for radical groups, both indigenous and external (al Qaeda), and will increase the already high anti-Americanism in the region. Second, many groups or radical Islamists have joined the jihad in Iraq and have subsequently taken their new found terrorist skills back to their home states and "will soon foment" trouble, whether in targeting US troops, those of regional partners, or a host of "soft targets" throughout Africa.
6. Ted Dagne, "Africa and War on Terror," in *The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response* (New York: Nova, 2004), ed. by John Davis.
7. Craig Smith, "US Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists," *New York Times*, May 11, 2004, p. A4.
8. Dan Darling, "ICG Report on the Sahel Region," April 11, 2005. <http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/006649.php>. The site was accessed on December 8, 2006.
9. Stephen Schwartz, "Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Nigeria," *The Jamestown Foundation*, October 21, 2005. <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369814>. The site was accessed on December 8, 2006.
10. Ibid.
11. Much more will be said about political terrorism in Chapter 6.
12. A few books illustrate the point. See General Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Algeria 1955–1957* (New York: Enigma Books, 2004) and John A. Berry and Carol Pott Berry, eds, *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1999), and Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 1979), are but few examples of political terrorism in Africa.
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14. Franklyne Ogbunwezeh, "Africa: The Ontology of Failed States," <http://www.dawodu.com/ogbunwezeh1.htm>. The site was accessed on December 8, 2006.
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16. Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa Hearing on "Fighting Terrorism in Africa" by Princeton N. Lyman Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow and Director of Africa Policy Studies, April 1, 2004. Council of Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/6912/terrorist_threat_in_africa.html?breadcrumb=default. The site was accessed on December 8, 2006.
17. Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 151–152.
18. Ibid., p. 154.
19. "Do al Qaeda's East Africa Operations Pose a Threat to US Interests?" *Power and Interests News Reports* (PINR), December 1, 2004. http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_

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 26. See Edgar O' Balance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).
 27. David C. Martin and John L. Walcott, *Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 251-259.